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G. Boehm et al.2981. Introduction
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (US Public Law 98-417), commonly known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act, was signed into law on September 24th 1984
following a vote of 362-0 in favor in the House of Representatives
of the 98th Congress and passage through the Senate on by voice
vote1,2. The Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Patent Act, established an
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process, provided for
ﬁling of generic drug applications 60 days later, and so created the
modern US generic drug industry3. Although the Hatch-Waxman
Act was passed with overwhelming support in the US Congress, it
was, and remains, an uneasy compromise and a delicate balance
between the interests of the brand-name drug industry and the
generic drug industry (Table 1 4). The legislation is complex and
has given rise to many unforeseen situations as the industry has
developed over the subsequent years. The history of the US
generic drug industry after the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman
Act has presented several lessons which are of beneﬁt to other
countries wishing to establish or re-establish a domestic generic
drug industry, and especially so for countries like China, where
generic drugs constitute the largest share of the pharmaceutical
industry and drug consumption.
Prior to passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, there were
relatively few generic drug products in the US. The 1962
amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act)
had some unintended consequences3. The requirements imposed
by the amendments to gain approval to market a new drug had
made the approval process costly and lengthy. With the exception
of antibiotics, generic drugs were approved via a “paper NDA”
process which required ﬁling scientiﬁc literature to support the
safety and efﬁcacy of a generic drug, since the FDA regarded the
safety and efﬁcacy data ﬁled by the innovator as proprietary.
However, for the majority of branded drug products, excluding the
antibiotics that were not subjected to the requirement, the
innovator companies did not publish sufﬁcient scientiﬁc literature
to enable justiﬁcation of safety and efﬁcacy via the “paper NDA”
route3. Hence in 1983 only 35% of top-selling branded drugs with
expired patents had generic competition, and the generic market
share was only 13%5,6. These generic drug products required that a
prescription be written for the generic.
The Hatch-Waxman Act addressed the shortcomings of the
post-1962 amendments to the FD&C Act situation by providing a
less arduous approval route for generic products but restoring a
new drug patent term lost by the post-1962 NDA process1. Thus,
and as suggested by the name, the Hatch-Waxman Act is a
compromise between the interests of the brand and generic
industries7.
Title I of the Hatch-Waxman Act amended Section 505 of the
FD&C Act to create an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) which allowed approval of generics as equivalent
products to an existing brand product(1) (called a reference listed
drug, RLD) on the basis of bioequivalence. It allowed for some
variance in the RLD provided this was approved via a petition
before ﬁling.
Title II of the Hatch-Waxman made two changes to Title 35 of
the United States Code regarding patent law: it amended the
statute to provide for restoration of that part of the patent term lost(1)Also could be generic products.to the time taken for FDA required pre-market testing and review,
up to a maximum of 5 years for new drug applications. It amended
the statute to make using an invention solely for the purposes of
generating information to ﬁle an application not an act of
infringement and that ﬁling an ANDA or paper NDA that
challenges a patent could be deemed an act of infringement, albeit
an artiﬁcial infringement.
The Hatch-Waxman Act grants generic manufacturers the ability
to mount a validity challenge without incurring the cost of entry or
risking enormous damages ﬂowing from any possible infringement.
In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act requires that the FDA, among
other things, makes publicly available a list of approved drug
products with therapeutic equivalence evaluations with monthly
supplements, commonly known as the Orange Book. This list also
included patent and exclusivity listings for drug products where
those were in force, which were provided by the drug application
owner, and the FDA is obliged to list them8. Because the FDA-
published list included drug products designated as therapeutically
equivalent to an original drug product, it became possible for health
care providers to substitute a generic equivalent for a brand
product3. This allowed the creation of a substitution system where
state legislation would allow or mandate the substitution of generic
equivalents, where they exist, for prescriptions written for brand
products. The only exceptions to this substitution are if the
prescription is marked “Do Not Substitute” or the patient refuses
a generic substitution. This substitution system created the generic
industry marketing system where it is only necessary to get a
pharmacy to stock generic products to ensure their selling to
patients, and physicians need not know that a generic exists or that
it will be taken by their patients. Because the US drug distribution
and retail pharmacy industries are concentrated, a generic company
requires relatively few people to market its product. In addition, the
high prices for branded products means that pharmacy proﬁt
margins for generic products are higher as low priced generics
can tolerate a higher markup by the pharmacy9.
This substitution procedure created an extremely efﬁcient
marketing and distribution system and ensured the rapid “pull
through” of new generic products into the distribution chain due to
their higher proﬁtability. Studies have shown that patients and
doctors prefer brand name drugs, although pharmacy computer
systems default to substitute generic for brand-name drugs. Studies
also found problems with health insurance companies and poor
communication with the doctors' ofﬁces, leading to patient
confusion and poorer drug treatment10.
In 2012, generics reached 84% of dispensed prescriptions, and
spending in this segment grew by $8 billion11. The fourth annual
Generic Drug Savings Study revealed remarkable reductions in
health care costs over the previous 10 years (from 2002 to 2011)12.
Clearly, despite all the attempts by the brand industry to counter
generic product development and use after the enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drugs have risen to become a
signiﬁcant majority of the US prescription pharmaceutical market
by volume. This has been driven entirely by cost. Because the
brand pharmaceutical industry has chosen to maintain very high
costs for products dispensed through retail pharmacies, it has
created a huge incentive for payers to switch to generics and for
retail pharmacies to dispense generics13–16.
There is no doubt that the US generic industry has been
successful beyond the wildest dreams of those who formulated
the Hatch-Waxman Act. Even though successful, the development
of the generic drug industry has been anything but smooth and the
rest of this paper will discuss some key events since its enactment.
Table 1 A delicate balance between the interests of the brand-name drug industry and the generic drug
industry according to the Hatch-Waxman Act4.
Encourage competition Reward technical advance
Generic manufacturers Brand manufacturers
 ANDA process  only bioequivalence required
 Allows testing before the brand patent expires
 Creates incentive 180-day marketing exclusivity
for the ﬁrst successful ANDA ﬁling with patent
challenge
 Deﬁnes the conditions for patent extensions
 100% approval time+50% testing time
 Up to maximum extension of 5 years
 Patent life cannot be extended beyond 14 years
 Non-patent exclusivity
 NDA data kept as proprietary by FDA
 Excludes salts or esters of approved drugs
 Three years exclusivity for improvements to
approved brand products via clinical trials (e.g.,
new uses, dosage forms, dosage regimens)
 Sets forth a process for patent challenges
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The beginning of the modern generic drug industry was marked by
fraud and other criminality on the part of some companies that almost
destroyed the industry before it got started. The fraud was pervasive
from 1984 to 1989 and became collectively known as the Generic
Drug Scandal17,18. The generic drug scandal reduced consumers'
perception of the quality of generic drugs19,20. With the passage of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, the ﬁeld for new generic drug products was wide
open with many top selling brand-name drugs available for generic
competition21. The Hatch-Waxman Act granted 180-day marketing
exclusivity to the ﬁrst ﬁled ANDA containing a paragraph IV
certiﬁcation (a patent challenge). If the ﬁrst ﬁled paragraph IV
applicant was sued and won in court, they would get 180 days of
exclusive marketing of the generic. Generic companies knew that the
ﬁrst approved generic product would attract relatively high prices and
take the majority of the generic market share22, and those who entered
later would reap lower margins. Therefore the race was on to develop
products and ﬁle ﬁrst to gain ﬁrst approval for a given product. Also
driving the race to ﬁle was the fact that FDA had a “ﬁrst in, ﬁrst
reviewed” policy, although it would later become known that some
FDA reviewers were bribed to manipulate this policy23. The stakes
were high for the new industry and tens or hundreds of millions of
dollars in potential proﬁts were at stake.
Fraud began on day one of the new industry. One company,
Bolar Pharmaceuticals, was reported to have driven to the FDA
and ﬁled 40 ANDAs on November 23rd 1984. It would later be
found that all of these ANDAs were fraudulent, fabricated for the
purpose of ﬁling ﬁrst to ensure a timely approval24. One generic
company, Mylan Laboratories, had complained to the FDA-CDER
Division of Generic Drugs (DGD) that ANDAs were not being
reviewed according to the “ﬁrst in, ﬁrst reviewed” policy and that
some applicants were receiving favored treatment17. By 1988,
Mylan became frustrated with the lack of response to their
complaints of favoritism and hired a private detective to investi-
gate. Evidence of bribery of DGD reviewers was found and turned
over to the US House of Representatives Energy and Commerce
Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (the
Subcommittee). The Subcommittee began an investigation that
revealed bribery and fraud, and resulted in charges against FDA
ofﬁcials and generic drug companies and some of their executives,
managers, and employees. The investigation continued for several
years and investigators from the Department of Justice andDepartment of Health and Human Services discovered that not
only had there been bribery, but that some companies had
submitted fraudulent data, substituting brand product for generic
product as samples in bioequivalence testing25,26.
In all, thirty individuals and nine companies were either found
guilty or admitted their role in FDA corruption. At one point, in the
subcommittee investigation during a press brieﬁng, it was reported
that subcommittee staff stated that “of 39 generic drug companies…
(investigated)… only about a half dozen appear to be free of criminal
or regulatory taint”27. Representative John Dingell, Chairman of the
Subcommittee, declared that the generic drug industry was “the most
pervasively corrupt this subcommittee has ever uncovered”28.
Clearly by late 1990 the public's faith in generic drugs and in
FDA's ability to regulate the drug industry was severely shaken29.
Among the 1009 consumers of a broad range of ages surveyed by
Gallup in October 1989 to ascertain their attitudes toward generic
drugs after the scandal, 51% feared that generic drugs were not
manufactured to the same standards as brand medications and more
than 70% indicated that the scandal had affected their conﬁdence in
generic drugs to some degree19. Realizing the risks of lack of trust in
FDA and to the ﬂedgling generic drug industry, FDA acted very
aggressively to root out fraud. Indeed so aggressive was FDA's
approach that one industry analyst reported “everybody is scared to
death about the FDA because they know the FDA means business”30.
This aggressive approach was successful in restoring public con-
ﬁdence in both FDA's ability to regulate the drug industry and in
generic drug products, although it took many years before public
conﬁdence in generic drugs returned to pre-scandal levels.
Two major steps were taken to rectify the problems revealed by
the Generic Drug Scandal and to restore public faith in generic
drugs. First was the passage of the Generic Drug Enforcement Act
(GDEA) which gave FDA the ability to take actions against
persons or corporations abusing FDA regulations31. These actions
included debarment, withdrawal of product approval, suspension
of product distribution, and the ability to levy civil penalties32.
Second was a large product analysis effort aimed at determining
whether generic drug products obtained from the market met
product speciﬁcations. By November of 1989 the FDA had
analyzed over 2500 product samples representing the 30 most
prescribed generic products. Less than 1% failed to meet product
speciﬁcations and none was deemed a health threat33.
The broad-scale unreliability of data submitted to support
marketing approval applications, particularly fraudulent data in
G. Boehm et al.300records submitted in premarket approval applications during the
generic drug scandal, resulted in the establishment of the applica-
tion integrity policy by FDA in the early 1990s34. In addition to
the very public actions, FDA took numerous other actions in the
wake of the Scandal in an effort to prevent a recurrence in the
future6,35, including:
 Institution of a new system to control new drug sponsors'
access to application reviewers. The new system required
formal requests for meetings and those meetings, which are
now usually held by telephone, had to be held with a Project
Manager and the Reviewer's Supervisor. Uncontrolled and
unsupervised access to reviewers had facilitated the bribery
that had occurred as part of the scandal. Establishment of a strict application queue system to assign
applications to “the next available reviewer” on a ﬁrst-come
basis. Although such a system had existed previously, this
was a much more robust system that had better visibility
within the Ofﬁce of Generic Drugs (OGD). All ANDAs had to be complete when ﬁled. A “received for
ﬁling” procedure was instituted to ensure that each ANDA
received for ﬁling by OGD was complete. Previously
applications could be ﬁled incomplete and amended with
additional data, such as additional strengths test batches,
stability test results, bioequivalence studies, etc. This created
situations where fraudulent information could be ﬁled to get a
position in the review queue. If subsequent to initial ﬁling
failures occurred, there was a temptation for the sponsor to
overlook or manipulate failing data to keep the review
moving forward. In addition, post ﬁling failures wasted
review resources. Establishment of the Ofﬁce of Generic Drugs for ANDA
review. Previously this function resided in the Division of
Generic Drugs which was not a separate ofﬁce within the
Ofﬁce of Pharmaceutical Sciences. This action raised the
status and management visibility of generic drugs within the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). Pre-
viously generic drug review had been seen as a sub-branch
of the review divisions and this lack of visibility may have
been a contributing factor to the failure to recognize the
problems for so long. Establishment of the pre-approval inspection (PAI) system.
This system was put into place to verify the accuracy of data
ﬁled in an application. A number of ﬁrms ﬁled in their
ANDAs fraudulent data which were made to appear genuine
on the surface. The PAI system sent FDA compliance
investigators into ﬁrms to verify the accuracy of ﬁled data. Institution of measures to address bioequivalence studies
including the establishment of the retention sample require-
ments, ﬁnancial interest disclosure requirements, and
increased inspection of contract research organizations con-
ducting generic drug bioequivalence studies. During investi-
gations that followed the initial disclosure of fraud and
bribery, it was discovered that some ﬁrms had substituted
brand-name product samples for generic product samples in
bioequivalence studies26. These measures were meant to
prevent bioequivalence fraud. Establishment of the FDA Ofﬁce of Ombudsman reporting
directly to the Commissioner. The Ombudsman receives and
investigates complaints from both within and outside the
FDA and provides remedies where necessary. Mylan Labora-
tories had complained repeatedly to DGD that they believed
there were irregularities in the review queue order and theorder of approvals, and claimed these complaints were
ignored by those responsible for DGD management17,22.
Had the early complaints been properly investigated, the
outcome in the public view would have been much more
favorable for FDA.The root cause of the generic drug scandal was the large
number of generic product opportunities suddenly presented by the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the proﬁts that could be made by
companies securing competitive FDA application approvals for
these new generic drug products. Some companies engaged in
criminal activities in order to gain an advantage in being ﬁrst to
market and to reap large proﬁts32. The fact that this was not
isolated to one or two companies but was apparently widespread in
the ﬂedgling generic drug industry brought the whole industry into
disrepute and severely shook conﬁdence in generic drug pro-
ducts26. It is apparent that FDA was too trusting of the new generic
drug industry and of its own staff. In retrospect, the ﬁling of such a
large number of ANDAs in the months following passage of the
Hatch-Waxman Act should have been a warning sign that all was
not as it seemed with these applications36. The lesson from the
scandal is that when you do not have a history of an industry, such
as the largely new generic drug industry, and there are potentially
large “windfall” proﬁts to be made, you need to put in place robust
systems to prevent bribery and fraud.3. “First-in, ﬁrst reviewed” and the “bundling” of approvals
According to FDA procedures for the review of generic drug
applications, applications should be reviewed in the order in which
they are received23. There are several common situations with
regard to possible time-of-approval scenarios for multiple ANDAs
for the same RLD37,38.
3.1. Approval limited by a patent expiry where patent life post-
RLD-approval is 45 years
In this situation, applications can be ﬁled over a fairly long period
of time and reviewed in the normal course of OGD ANDA review.
Several applications can be reviewed and ready for approval on the
day of patent expiry, so multiple generic approvals can be
expected regardless of the initial quality of the ANDA ﬁlings
because there are several years in which to address and correct
deﬁciencies. This situation provides a low competitive scenario
and little incentive to ﬁle high quality applications. Provided the
ﬁling is made several years ahead of patent expiry even poor
quality applications should be approved at market formation.
3.2. Approval is limited by new chemical entity (NCE)
exclusivity, no listed patents
In this situation, the time between ﬁling and NCE expiry is limited
and so only better quality applications, if reviewed in the normal
course of OGD ANDA review, would be expected to receive
approval at the expiry of NCE exclusivity. In this situation it is
possible to “bundle” approvals to ensure multiple approvals at
NCE expiry. Although one may expect that multiple approvals will
ensure low prices and remove the temptation of a windfall proﬁt, it
also removes the incentive to produce a high quality ﬁling since
ﬁlings of lower quality are “pushed through” to ensure multiple
day 1 approvals.
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“Paragraph IV” ﬁlings
In this situation, one or more Orange Book listed patents is
challenged as not infringed, invalid, or unenforceable. The law
provides that the ﬁrst person to ﬁle an application containing a
Paragraph IV certiﬁcation is entitled to 6 months of marketing
exclusivity if the applicant is sued for patent infringement and
successful in winning that suit21. Obviously the prospect of 6 months
of exclusive marketing is a potentially large windfall proﬁt and an
enormous incentive to achieve the ﬁrst ﬁled position. This situation
strongly encourages ﬁling quickly rather than after good product
development; the reward is for being ﬁrst, not for being good.
Clearly what is occurring here in the ﬁrst two situations is that
FDA is attempting to remove the windfall proﬁt incentive through
ensuring competition in as many situations as possible as a way of
eliminating the commercial incentive that was the cause of the
fraudulent applications during the ﬁrst 5 years after the enactment
of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Unfortunately, this also largely
removes the incentive for doing good development and ﬁling
complete, high quality applications, since that approach costs more
and provides no advantage. Policy makers should consider the use
of commercial advantage through more timely approvals to
encourage the behavior they want to see, high quality ﬁlings and
good development of robust products. High quality development is
more expensive and takes longer so the best way to ensure it
occurs is to make it more proﬁtable39.
In the third situation, the ﬁrst-to-ﬁle Paragraph IV, the legisla-
tion potentially rewards the ﬁrst ﬁler, and in doing so effectively
punishes other ﬁlers. This is perhaps the ultimate encouragement
to do bad product development as speed to ﬁle is the sole
determinant of success. It is virtually impossible in this situation
to do good product development and succeed in ﬁling ﬁrst. The
current state is that many ANDA ﬁlings contain Paragraph IV
patent certiﬁcations rather than the few in the ﬁrst decade of the
Hatch-Waxman Act21. The incentive to challenge patents should
be the possibility of obtaining a competitive approval if both your
product development and your legal basis are of high quality.
If a regulatory authority wants to encourage good product
development and high quality ﬁlings, they should align these aims
with the commercial success gained from high quality product
development. If approvals are bundled together regardless of ﬁling
quality, or if ﬁling ﬁrst rather than ﬁling best is rewarded, the
senior corporate managers will not spend the time and money
required for a high quality development.4. Bioequivalence and switchability
The system of marketing generic drugs in the United States is one
of “switching” from a brand product to a generic equivalent
(usually an AB-rated generic in the Orange Book). This substitu-
tion is performed by the pharmacist, the prescription is most often
written as a brand name product. One consequence of this system
of substitution is that patients have their medication “switched”
either from brand to generic or from one generic to another generic
without input from or knowledge of the physician or the
patient40,41.
The system of determining equivalents depends on the product
type42,43. The most frequent types are:
 Bioequivalence determined by single dose blood level
studies, with the test and reference products determined tobe bioequivalent if Cmax and AUC meet conﬁdence interval
requirements of 80%–125% at the 90% level. AUC measures
the extent of drug absorption (or exposure), and Cmax is a
surrogate measure of rate of absorption (that is over what time
period the drug is absorbed). Bioequivalence determined by clinical equivalence studies
either with or without blood level studies. This system
typically is used when the action of the drug in the drug
product is not a result of systemic absorption of the drug. For
example topically applied drug products or inhaled drug
products generally fall into this category. Bioequivalence determined by the rate of in vitro drug
dissolution from the drug product. This is generally applied
to situations where the drug is highly soluble and no in vivo
nonequivalence issues are expected. Bioequivalence is determined because the drug products are
true solutions of the drug substance. Generally, if the true
solution is not a solution for oral administration, then the
formulation of the product must also be the same as the RLD
(with certain limited exceptions). Some drug products in this
class also require equivalent systems of administration (e.g.,
nasal spray, inhaled nebulizer, ophthalmic dropper).The often stated standard is that equivalent generic products
have the same safety and efﬁcacy proﬁle as the RLD to which they
are compared. This is probably true in virtually all cases44.
However, when considering how generics products are dispensed
in the USA, the standard is that they must be “switchable”,
essentially identical. Patients can be switched from the brand to a
generic or from one generic to another by the dispensing
pharmacist with no input beyond that the switched products are
rated as interchangeable in the Orange Book20. Switchability is a
higher standard than “same safety and efﬁcacy proﬁle”. Even from
the beginning there have been complaints that some generic
products are not switchable41,45,46. In the early years, there was
a strong campaign by some brand drug companies to discredit
generics and complaints concerning switchability were dismissed
as just part of the campaign to discredit41,42,47. However, while the
brand-name company anti-generic tactics have largely subsided,
the complaints concerning switchability of some classes of drugs,
and of some speciﬁc drug products have continued and gained
more credence in recent years45,46. Some groups believe that
antiepileptic drugs (AEDs) have switchability issues and claim that
break-through seizures occur following switching and are resolved
upon switching back to the original medication48,49. One physician
group advises switching with caution when patients are stabilized
on a particular AED drug therapy48.
In the last few years there have been issues with some speciﬁc
generic products in switchability40,50. One product that generated a
lot of debate concerning switchability was generic Bupropion
ER51. Many patients claimed that when switched from Wellbutrin
XL to a generic there was a lack of efﬁcacy for the generic
product. There do appear to be differences in the blood level
proﬁles between the generic and the branded product, although the
generic meets Cmax and AUC conﬁdence interval standards. It has
been reported that Teva, the generic marketer, undertook a clinical
study to test whether the brand and generic are equivalent in a
double blinded study52. FDA reviewed new data that indicate
Budeprion XL 300 mg (bupropion hydrochloride extended-release
tablets) manufactured by Impax Laboratories, Inc. and marketed
by Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. is not therapeutically equiva-
lent to Wellbutrin XL 300 mg. FDA has changed the therapeutic
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BX, signifying that Budeprion XL 300 mg fails to demonstrate
therapeutic equivalence to Wellbutrin XL 300 mg. Impax has
requested the Agency withdraw approval of Budeprion XL 300 mg
extended-release tablets. The announcement does not affect the
Impax/Teva Budeprion 150 mg product or generic bupropion
products made by other manufacturers53.
The types of products most susceptible to switching issues are
those with patient perceived feedback and/or generally complex
drug release proﬁles. Examples of drug classes with patient
perceived feedback include analgesics, antidepressants, hypnotics,
anticonvulsants, etc.44,54. These are drug classes where the patient
can relatively easily perceive the effect of the medication. Types of
dosage forms most likely to give rise to switchability issues are
those where the dosage form exerts signiﬁcant control on the
pattern of drug release or where inactive ingredients inﬂuence the
action of the drug, for example affect penetration of the drug into
the target tissue. Products currently being examined are mostly
modiﬁed-release oral products with complex drug release pro-
ﬁles54. Some of these products have patents protecting the
formulation that gives rise to the drug proﬁle, and so generic
product sponsors are trying to circumvent the patented formulation
but still meet the Cmax and AUC bioequivalence conﬁdence
intervals. Some examples of this type of product are:Bupropion XL 150 mg – The RLD has an initial delay in
drug release due to a delayed-release coating; some generic
products did not employ the delayed-release component51–54.
Ambien CR – The RLD is 50% immediate-release and 50%
controlled release. Some generics altered that ratio to avoid
the patent55–58.
Concerta – The RLD has an immediate-release outer layer
and an osmotic pump extended-release core. The blood level
proﬁle is largely independent of food effect. Some generics
are attempting to use a hydrophilic matrix extended-release
core or not to have the immediate-release component55–58.
Adderall XR – The RLD is a mixture of immediate-release
pellets and delayed-release pellets. Some generics are using a
short extended-release or a pH-independent pulsatile release59.
Cardizem CD – The RLD has a ratio 40:60 of fast releasing
drug and slow releasing drug which gives rise to a double
peak in blood level. Some generics used a single type of drug
release to yield a single blood level peak60.There are several possible issues that might relate to switch-
ability. FDA states switchability or “interchangeability” as “the
risk of alternating or switching between use of the product and the
reference product is not greater than the risk of maintaining the
patient on the reference product”61. This recognizes that there may
be dose-to-dose or lot-to-lot variation in the reference product. A
switchable generic should fall within the variability envelope ofTable 2 Average of generic/innovator (test/reference)
estimates).
BE parameter Number of studies
AUCt 2070
AUC1 1939
Cmax 2070
AUC: area under the concentration-time curve; BE: bioequiva
nMean7standard deviation (SD).the reference product, which may range from essentially zero
variability for an immediate-release BCS Class I product to
signiﬁcant variability for some complex products such as some
modiﬁed-release products62–64.
Much effort in this area has been focused on potential
bioavailability differences between generic and reference products
or theoretically even wider differences between generics. The US
standard for generic bioequivalence is that the “true” mean of the
generic product Cmax and AUC must be between 80% and 125%
(log-transformed data) at the 90% conﬁdence level as measured by
two one-sided t-tests. Critics have pointed to this standard as
potentially allowing a generic to differ from a reference by as
much as 20% and two generics by as much as 40%. This is
somewhat of an exaggeration; however the difference for a very
well behaved drug and dosage form could be 15% from reference
and still pass conﬁdence interval65. The corresponding worst case
for two generics would then be a 30% difference in “true”
geometric means. FDA recently (April 13th and 14th, 2010) asked
the Advisory Committee for Pharmaceutical Science and Clinical
Pharmacology (ACPS-CP) whether the acceptance criteria should
be tightened such that the calculated ratio of the means for
bioequivalence (the so-called point estimate) should be constrained
to fall within 90%–111% (log-transformed data)66. As part of
FDA's presentation to the ACPS-CP, data was presented from
2070 bioequivalence studies for solid oral products. These studies
were from approved ANDAs from the period 1996–2007. The test/
reference ratios are shown in the table below (Table 2)65.
Analysis of these studies shows that the great majority of
generic products already fall within the proposed 90%–111%
range for the geometric mean ratio and the grand means for Cmax
and for AUC are very close to 1 (Fig. 1). Frequency histograms
presented at the April 14, 2010 meeting of the ACPS-CP showed
that while Cmax is slightly more variable than AUCt, the great
majority of bioequivalence studies over the 12 year period
analyzed fell within the proposed 90%–111% point estimate
range. It was stated that based on Cmax, only about 6% of studies
fell outside these limits64. The ACPS-CP voted 12 to 2 against
adopting the 90%–111% limits for geometric mean ratio for Cmax
and AUC. The committee felt that this is primarily a public
perception issue and that imposing a further limitation was not
justiﬁed, that increased efforts in public education were better than
additional and possibly unnecessary regulations66.
At the same two day meeting the question of whether to use
partial AUC (pAUC) bioequivalence in assessing the bioequiva-
lence of complex release proﬁle modiﬁed-release drug products
should be recommended. The committee expressed concern with
the large number of subjects that would be required to obtain
sufﬁcient power for bioequivalence assessment based on pAUC.
The committee felt that evaluating time of onset was important but
could not suggest methodology at this time55,66.bioequivalence parameter geometric mean ratios*(point
Geometric mean ratio Range
1.0070.04 0.86–1.16
1.0070.04 0.86–1.16
1.0070.06 0.83–1.18
lence; and Cmax: peak drug plasma concentration.
Figure 1 Distribution of Cmax ratios and AUCt ratios shows that the great majority of generic products already fall within the proposed 90%–
111% range for the geometric mean ratio and the grand means for Cmax and for AUC are very close to 1
65.
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and its Advisory Committee feel that much of the switching
complaints are “placebo” effect and not grounded in any real
differences between bioequivalent products67. There is a lack of well
controlled studies in this area and the question of switchability is
likely to remain unanswered until such studies are performed. From a
public health perspective this is an important question regarding the
approval and use of generic drug products. Given the complexity of
disease states and the diversity of the patient population, it would
seem improbable that all generic drug products would be switchable
based solely on the bioequivalence criteria. While it may be
considered expedient to continue to maintain that all bioequivalent
generic drug products are switchable, it would seem from a scientiﬁc
view to be an unlikely situation.
The debate on switchability has focused on possible differences
between brand drugs and generic drugs that might occur within the
constraints of the bioequivalence statistical range, however that
involves an assumption that commercial batches of generic products
perform exactly as the exhibit batch(es) subjected to bioequivalence
studies. Many of these generic products are scaled up for commercial
manufacture and changes might occur as a result of the scale-up, for
example changes in drug substance particle size or changes in dosage
form properties. If this kind of product change does occur at some
level, then individual generic drug products might have an altered
bioavailability proﬁle and so possibly present switchability issues.
One study of a calcium channel blocker published in 1993
showed differences between bioequivalence in young healthy
volunteers when compared to older patients68. Both generic
products were bioequivalent to the reference product in young
healthy volunteers, but only one of the two was bioequivalent in
older patients. Another publication in 1997 showed differences in
bioequivalence in older patients with yet another generic product
of this reference product; however, the authors concluded these
differences were not clinically signiﬁcant69.(2)Note that some variations are allowed from Q1/Q2 for some dosage
forms. These are deﬁned in 21CFR.5. Bioequivalence methodology for complex dosage forms
Methodology for bioequivalence determination for some complex
dosage forms remains to be deﬁned. The Hatch-Waxman Actdeﬁned single dose blood level studies as the method of establish-
ing bioequivalence for systemically acting drug products. The
FDA was to deﬁne methodology for dosage forms where systemic
blood levels, if present, are not related to or relevant to the
pharmacological action of the drug product. There are many
dosage forms where systemic blood levels cannot be used to
determine bioequivalence as the product is not intended to be
systemically active. Examples include:Topicals – creams, lotions, solutions, shampoos, nail
varnish, etc.
Ophthalmic and otic drops – solutions and suspensions.
Dosage forms intended to act within the gastrointestinal tract
lumen – orally administered, suppositories, rectal solutions, etc.One way to determine that a non-systemically active generic
product was “bioequivalent” was to formulate the generic in an
identical way to the RLD, qualitatively and quantitatively the
same, the so-called “Q1/Q2” approach. While this approach is
attractive, it will only work where the RLD formulation can be
determined with the necessary accuracy (within 75% w/w for all
inactive ingredients) and where the form of the drug substance is
known; almost always implying the drug substance is in solution
within the dosage form. While Q1/Q2 is required for some dosage
forms(2), for example, parenterals, otic and ophthalmic drops or
semi-solids, being Q1/Q2 does not necessarily imply being
“bioequivalent”. For example, if the drug substance is a solid
present in the dosage form as a dispersion, then being Q1/Q2 does
not imply that the drug will act in an identical way to the RLD.
That will depend on the drug substance having the identical
particle size distribution, polymorphic form, and for some complex
dosage forms, being present in the same phase of the dosage form.
Since it is currently virtually impossible to deﬁne and then achieve
the exact form of the RLD drug substance solid form, clinical
equivalence studies are required in addition to Q1/Q2. Addition-
ally formulation patents may prevent taking the Q1/Q2 approach.
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clinical effect, such as, for example, cure of an infection or
resolution of a dermatological condition such as a rash, a clinical
equivalence study can be designed and conducted to show clinical
equivalence. Depending on the dosage form, some bioequivalence
guidelines that recommend clinical equivalence studies also
require systemic blood level studies. Although clinical equivalence
studies can be lengthy and costly, they do provide a mechanism
for demonstrating bioequivalence to achieve an AB rating for a
successful generic applicant. Clinical equivalence studies can be
expensive and risky; however with the very signiﬁcant increase in
brand product prices over the last several years, the ﬁnancial risk is
much more appealing than it was 10 years ago.
Although the FDA has made signiﬁcant progress in deﬁning
bioequivalence methodology for many of these non-systemically
active drug products, particularly in the last decade or so, a number
of products remain without determined methodology. Perhaps the
largest group of products in this category is the inhaled drug
products. While FDA was directed to determine bioequivalence
methodology, the necessary resources were not speciﬁcally pro-
vided to undertake the research work necessary. As a result, lack
of resources in this area has hampered the research work necessary
to establish bioequivalence methodology for some complex dosage
forms. In recognition of the current lack of resources, the Generic
Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012 (GDUFA) allocates some of
the fee income to research programs to establish bioequivalence
methodology, including bioequivalence of local acting orally
inhaled drug products, pharmacokinetic studies and evaluation of
anti-epileptic drugs, and evaluation of drug product physical
attributes on patient acceptability (e.g., tablet size, shape, coating,
and scoring conﬁguration).6. Products for which a bioequivalence determination is not
possible
There is a small group of products for which it is not possible to
develop AB-rated generics equivalents. These fall into two broad
categories.6.1. Ill-deﬁned active product ingredients
Some products have an active ingredient (or ingredients) that are
not sufﬁciently deﬁned or speciﬁed to enable a generic equivalent
to be developed. The most notable of these is PREMARINs
(conjugated estrogens tablets). The active ingredients are a mixture
of conjugated estrogens extracted from the urine of pregnant
mares. The mixture is not completely deﬁned and the relative
importance of the various components to the safety and efﬁcacy of
this product is not known. In the absence of this information it is
not possible to deﬁne the content or the concentration ranges of
conjugated estrogens required to match the RLD. Since the active
product ingredient (API) cannot be speciﬁed, it is not possible to
have an AB-rated generic equivalent.
If an active ingredient is not sufﬁciently deﬁned to allow
development of a generic equivalent, it raises the question of how
you know that the active ingredient is still the same as that used for
the safety and efﬁciency studies that formed the basis of the
original approval.6.2. “Bad” dosage forms
Some dosage forms, most notably solid orals, have excessive unit-
to-unit and/or batch-to-batch variability and/or the drug release
changes over shelf life due to poor design of the dosage form. In
extreme circumstances this can prevent the development of an AB-
rated generic equivalent since it is not possible to pass bioequi-
valence studies due to the “moving target” nature of the RLD.
Examples include:
 Diazide (Dyazide) – a powder ﬁlled capsule of a potassium-
sparing diuretic (triamterene) and a thiazide diuretic (hydro-
chlorothiazide) that was apparently manufactured by an
unstable dry blending process using an excessive amount of
magnesium stearate to control the release of drug. The
variable nature of the RLD dosage form made it impossible
to develop a generic to this poorly developed RLD. Paxil CR – an extended-release tablet of paroxetine HCl
which claims to be based on Geomatrix™ tablet technology.
This product showed excessive variability to the point where
the NDA sponsor could not pass a single dose bioequivalence
study performed as part of a manufacturing site transfer.
Although patent protection for Paxil CR was relatively weak,
it took over 12 years before a single generic was approved.For both of these products it is an inappropriate dosage form
design and/or manufacturing process which leads to the variability
and “moving target” aspect of the RLD and makes it extremely
difﬁcult if not impossible to develop an AB-rated generic
equivalent. There would seem to be no rationale for dosage forms
that exhibit such instability in manufacture and regulatory autho-
rities should consider the feasibility of developing a generic
equivalent when approving new products.7. Patent “evergreening”
The Hatch-Waxman Act made provisions for encouraging generic
sponsors to challenge innovator-listed patents in order to prevent
“evergreening”, the strategy of obtaining serial patent protection
for a drug product70. During the drafting of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, there was discussion of evergreening. The provisions included
in the law for patent challenges, for ﬁrst-to-ﬁle marketing
exclusivity, and for modiﬁcation of the patent statute to allow
patent suits to be brought following ﬁling of an ANDA were all
aimed at making patent challenges attractive to generic compa-
nies37,71. In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act included a provision
to “carve out” newly patented indications as they were potentially
seen as a way of maintaining patent protection for prolonged
periods following expiry of the original patent(s).
There were some follow-on patents at the time of passage of the
Hatch-Waxman Act but patent challenges were relatively uncom-
mon in the early years of the generic industry. In later years, the
majority of drug products have used a patent “evergreening”
strategy72. The evergreening strategies used most commonly
include obtaining additional patents on speciﬁc features of a
pharmaceutical product, such as isomers, polymorphs, metabolites,
intermediates, process patents, or double patenting, product hop-
ping to extend the exclusivity of a drug product after the patents
listed in the Orange Book have expired. In fact, it could be argued
that it is almost negligent on the part of brand company senior
managers not to attempt this market protection strategy on behalf
of their shareholders. Brand loyalty that a new product-line
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stand rigid despite the entry of generic drugs facilitated by the
Hatch-Waxman Act73. Beyond the goal of the Hatch-Waxman,
one of the impacts of the patent evergreening is generic innovation
by obtaining design-around patents, to invent an alternative to a
patented invention that does not infringe the patent claim, or a
more efﬁcient manufacturing process, new formulations, or a new
form of the active ingredient. Thus with more ANDAs ﬁled than
ever, there are an increased number of “me-too” ANDAs and
ANDAs for products that already have generic versions. While in
the early years the success rate for generics challenging listed
patents was about 75%, this has dropped considerably in recent
years as the number of challenges has increased and in the race to
be ﬁrst-to-ﬁle, much riskier patent challenge positions are being
pursued74,75.
In the ﬁrst decade of this century, the overall success rate for the
generic drug industry was 48% for cases that have gone to trial.
However, the success rate increases to 76% when settlements are
included. Over half of all cases are settled or dropped76.
Many types of “evergreening” have been tried (Table 3), some
being more successful than others70,71. One aspect not foreseen in
the original legislative framework was the use of pay-for-delay
settlements between innovators of a drug product and later generic
ﬁlers6,38. In these settlements the generic company typically
acknowledges the validity of the brand company's patent(s) in
exchange for the right to go to market ahead of brand patent
expiry77. This prevents a judgment in a patent suit which might
affect the brand company's future patent position and guarantees
the generic company the right to exclusive or semi-exclusive
marketing for a period of time. While the parties to such
settlements say they are good for the public because they
guarantee generic entry ahead of patent expiry, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) believes these settlements actually delay
generic entry and are therefore anti-competitive38. According to
the FTC's annual report Overview of Agreements Filed in FY
(ﬁscal year) 2010, the FTC “received 113 ﬁnal resolutions of
patent disputes between a brand and a generic “during the year, 31
of which” contain both compensation to the generic manufacturer
and a restriction on the generic manufacturer's ability to market its
product78. “These so-called pay-for-delay agreements have sig-
niﬁcantly postponed substantial consumer savings from lower
generic drug prices. The FTC has recommended that Congress
should pass legislation to protect consumers from such antic-
ompetitive agreements78. FTC has pressed Congress and the courts
to make certain pay-for-delay settlements presumptively illegal.8. Authorized generics
The increasing prevalence of ‘authorized’ generics, that is the
brand company selling a version of the brand product as a generic
equivalent either itself or through a third party, appears designed to
defeat the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act 6-month marketingTable 3 Increasing trend of ﬁnal settlements, potential pay-for-delay
Type FY 2004 FY 2005
Final settlements 14 11
Potential pay-for-delay 0 3
Potential pay-for-delay involving ﬁrst ﬁlers 0 2exclusivity for ﬁrst-to-ﬁle Paragraph IV generic sponsors79–83.
Some see this as a deliberate attempt by the brand industry to
deprive a successful patent challenger of the proﬁts from the 6-
month exclusive marketing period80–82,84. Generic companies have
complained that authorized generics have taken the market price
for the generic lower than a second generic entrant would have,
and some brand company senior managers have stated that
authorized generics are in part a strategy to deprive generic
companies of proﬁts from patent challenges80–82. Authorized
generics do not require approval as they are the brand product
and so they are already approved80. If authorized generics are, in
fact, being marketed during the period of marketing exclusivity for
a successful generic patent challenger to deprive the generic
challenger of marketing exclusivity period proﬁts, then that is
clearly an attempt to defeat the intent of the Hatch-Waxman
Act77,81,82,85–87. Generic ﬁrms complain that authorized generics
undermine the incentives the Hatch-Waxman created to encourage
generic companies to challenge and invent around brand patents
and so bring generic products to market ahead of brand patent
expriy. They also complained that the authorized generics are
anticompetitive and undermine the incentive for bringing afford-
able generic medicines to market, and the authorized generics give
brand-name companies the unilateral right to masquerade the
branded drug as generic drug. If this is the case, a legislative
remedy may be needed, suggesting that the whole ﬁrst-to-ﬁle
system should be overhauled to remedy the incentive to make poor
quality ﬁlings.9. The generic marketplace, a generic “oligopoly”, and drug
shortages
A large proportion of the generic drug supply can be in the hands
of only a few large generic companies87. In calendar year 2009,
nearly 50% of the generic drug supply was produced by the top 4
generic companies. This can create a fragile drug supply situation
where production problems at one generic company can rapidly
lead to critical drug shortages that can take weeks or months to
resolve. This is most often an issue for mature generic products
where the major market share has been ceded to one manufacturer
and the other manufacturers, including the brand company, reduce
manufacturing capacity for the product or even cease manufacture
altogether. The table shows the total prescription share and the
generic prescription share of the top 4 generic companies
(Table 4). Note that this is a slight overestimate because the
Sandoz prescriptions are not broken out of the Novartis number87.
The ﬁgures are from IMS data. The prescription total for 2009 was
3922 million.
This oligopoly situation is largely the result of major purchasers
preferring to deal with only a few well known and well established
generic manufacturers. Since these major customers control so
much of the prescription drug market, they are essentially acting as
de facto “kingmakers” in the generic manufacturing marketplace87.settlement, and potential pay-for-delay involving ﬁrst ﬁlers78.
FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010
28 33 66 68 113
14 14 16 19 31
9 11 13 15 26
Table 4 Total prescription share and the generic prescription share of the top 4 generic
companies.
Company
Prescription share
(total Rx in millions)
Percentage total
(%)
Percentage generic
(%)
Teva 629.5 16.1 21.5
Mylan 343.1 8.7 11.6
Novartis (Sandoz) 238.8 6.1 8.1
Watson 234.7 6.0 8.0
Total 1446.1 36.9 49.2
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are a number of shortages attributable to “manufacturing issues” in
generic drug companies88. Many of these “issues” are themselves
attributable to FDA compliance problems faced by some of the
companies. The point, however, is that over time following the
introduction of generics, much of the drug product supply comes
from a single generic manufacturer, most often from a single
manufacturing plant. If problems occur, other suppliers cannot
react quickly enough to prevent a drug shortage.
In addition, the factors leading to drug shortages also include:
 Market factorsː the growth in demand has occurred while the
capacity of manufacturing facilities remained stable, leading
to a very high rate of capacity utilization. Supply chain issues: essential raw ingredient suppliers, active
pharmaceutical ingredient manufacturers, ﬁnal drug product
manufacturers, wholesalers, group purchasing organizations,
clinicians, and, ultimately, patients are affected89. Pricing and reimbursement policies: the impact of changes to
the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) on the reimburse-
ment rate for injectable drugs delivered in outpatient settings
and the capped the growth rate in Medicare's reimbursement
paid to providers for administering these drugs has been to
dramatically reduce the price of older, generic drugs adminis-
tered in non-hospital settings. Price ceilings (maximum prices
enforced by federal or state law) represent barriers to price
ﬂexibility. Price ceilings effectively prohibit prices from
adjusting to the levels where consumer demand is tempered
and suppliers are encouraged to increase production90. As a
result, supply and demand are not balanced. While large
government price ceilings hold down the price, the total cost,
which includes the cost of waiting time and other inefﬁcient
rationing mechanisms, actually increases91.According to the FDA, the primary reasons for drug shortages
include quality and manufacturing issues, and other reasons
include production delays at the manufacturer and delays compa-
nies experience receiving raw materials and components from
suppliers. The fundamental problem identiﬁed is the inability of
the market to observe and reward quality. This lack of reward for
quality can reinforce price competition and encourage manufac-
turers to keep costs down by minimizing quality investments.
These dynamics may have produced a market situation in which
quality problems have become sufﬁciently common and severe to
result in drug shortages.
When written in Chinese the word ‘crisis’ is composed of two
characters. One represents danger, and the other represents
opportunity92. Just as the reorganization after the generic drug
scandal, the FDA has begun to consider taking the potentialactions. A point has been reached where the FDA needs to engage
the marketplace to help address the manufacturing problems rather
than by the unilateral FDA actions. The buyers and payers could
be supported by FDA to provide meaningful manufacturing
quality metrics in their purchase and reimbursement decisions93.10. Review cycle time and number of applications
The Hatch-Waxman Act directed the FDA to review ANDAs
within 180 days and to make a decision to approve or disapprove
the application (the law did, however, allow for extensions of this
time period). Before the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed the FDA
was warning that it did not have enough reviewers to meet this
goal. Initially FDA estimated that up to 900 ANDAs might be ﬁled
in the ﬁrst 6 months and that 55–60 new reviewers would be
needed. This estimate was later revised to 90–100 new reviewers.
The Commissioner's prediction of a backlog was borne out when
370 new ANDAs were ﬁled within the ﬁrst week and 140 pending
paper NDAs were converted to ANDAs. However, by the end of
1985 average review cycle time was down to 140 days, as a result
of establishing the new DGD1.
When the generic drug scandal hit ANDA review essentially
froze as no one knew which ANDAs were fraudulent. But in the
period following the scandal, review resumed and consistently met
the 180-day goal. However, starting in the early 2000s the number
of ANDAs being ﬁled increased sharply. This has led to a backlog
and lengthening of review times. Over the past several years the
review and approval time for an ANDA has nearly doubled. It is
estimated that over 2700 ANDAs are now awaiting FDA review
and the average review time for an ANDA is nearing 32 months94.
Although OGD has funds to hire more reviewers, that has
happened only recently and it takes time to hire and train new
reviewers. In the period before they are fully trained, new staff
actually reduce overall application review productivity.
It seems clear that the US Federal Government has not staffed
OGD adequately for years. Given that generic drugs are now 84%
of all prescriptions ﬁlled in the US, FDA's emphasis may be on the
wrong sector of the drug industry. This is perhaps a consequence
of user fees, a system where government opts out of its ﬁscal
responsibilities by getting private industry to pay for its own
government oversight. This is not free money, it is simply added
onto the cost of medication and so is a “tax” that hits those who
buy drug products. The Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of
2012 (GDUFA) is designed to tackle the lack of resources to
review and approve generic drugs is generic user fees. In any case
it will take some time before adequate resources are available to
again meet the 180-day review for all ANDAs.
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the FDA agreed to expedite review of Paragraph IV applications
that are submitted on the ﬁrst day that any valid Paragraph IV
application for the drug in question is submitted to avoid the
possible forfeiture of 180-day exclusivity for failure to obtain
timely tentative approval95.11. Generic drug user fee (GDUFA)
Although new drug user fees have been vigorously supported by
the brand drug industry, the generic drug user fee has not, until
recently, been the case with generic drugs and the generic drug
industry. The ﬁrst call for a generic drug user fee (GDUFA) was in
1992, twenty years ago. At that time the generic industry
vigorously opposed the imposition of generic drug user fees.
The industry argued that generic drugs saved the Federal Govern-
ment health care programs billions of dollars and the cost of
generic drug review and approval was a tiny fraction of the
savings. So the argument was in essence that more and faster
generic drug approvals actually saved the Federal Government
vastly more money than it cost to review and approve generics.
Industry remained steadfastly opposed to the imposition of generic
drug user fees until 2009, when the major generic industry trade
associations abruptly reversed their long held position and for the
ﬁrst time since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and came
out in favor of user fees. The original argument that more and
faster generic drug approvals saved the Federal Government (and
the population at large) huge amounts of money was valid and the
amount of savings was accelerating with the passage of time, so
why did they change their stance on the subject? The major issue
that changed the generic industry view of and policy on user
fees was the same as that which encouraged the brand industry
to embrace user fees – review cycle time. For most of the time
since the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA had met or nearly met the
180-day mandate for review so little would be gained in review
turnaround by paying user fees. It would, however, have provided
more resources to address the issue of bioequivalence methodo-
logy for those drug products where such methodology is presently
lacking. While this is a minor issue compared to review cycle time,
it is becoming more important as some of the products in this
category have large values and are therefore becoming more
attractive targets for generic drug companies. Another issue
concerns compliance inspection of foreign facilities that develop and
manufacture generic drugs for import into the US. Over the years
since the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed, the proportion of generic
drugs being developed and manufactured in other countries has been
increasing. It has long been held by US domestic manufacturers that
FDA compliance inspections of foreign ﬁrms were not as thorough as
those conducted for domestic ﬁrms. In addition, with the large increase
in foreign facilities the FDA has been falling behind on its program for
foreign facility inspections. The FDA has ascribed this situation to
lack of resources and one of the important issues negotiated for
GDUFA is increasing resources to provide equal inspectional intensity
and timing for all facilities, domestic and foreign, so creating a “level
playing ﬁeld” with respect to compliance inspection of generic drug
development and manufacturing facilities96.
Prior to the 2006 ﬁscal year, although new ANDA ﬁlings had
been steadily increasing, the ANDA review backlog had been
stable at about the same level as new ﬁlings indicating that OGD
review was keeping pace with the new ﬁling rate. However from
2006 through 2009, although the new application ﬁling rate hadleveled out, the ANDA review backlog began to climb in a linear
manner. OGD review staff numbers also increased over this period
from about 190 in 2006 to about 260 in 2009, essentially
increasing at the same rate as the backlog was increasing. From
2009 the ANDA backlog took an alarming turn upward and,
although there are only two years of data to show, it appears to be
increasing in an exponential fashion although new ANDA ﬁlings
remain essentially ﬂat. Although review staff numbers increased
from 2009 to 2010, there is no increase between 2010 and 2011. It
should be noted that this was the period when negotiations on a
GDUFA were underway and so this apparent “freeze” may have
been as a result of an impending GDUFA.
There are two sources of generic drug user fees: (1) facility
(establishment) fees will account for 70% of annual GDUFA fees,
of which 80% will be paid by ﬁnished dose manufacturers and
20% paid by active pharmaceutical ingredient manufacturers; (2)
application fees – the remaining 30% of the annual GDUFA fees
will come from generic drug applications97. The industry and FDA
have agreed upon a number of additional goals, metrics, and
efﬁciencies set forth in detail in a negotiated goals letter in return
for fees, which should be reported to Congress annually.
 Application metrics: By year 5 of the program, the FDA will
review and act on 90% of complete electronic ANDAs within
10 months after the date of submission. Backlog metrics: the FDA will review and act on 90% of all
ANDAs and prior approval supplements regardless of current
review status (whether electronic, paper, or hybrid) pending
on October 1, 2012 by the end of FY 2017. cGMP inspections metrics: the FDA will conduct risk-
adjusted biennial cGMP surveillance inspections of generic
API and generic ﬁnished dosage form manufacturers, with the
goal of achieving parity of inspection frequency between
foreign and domestic ﬁrms by FY 2017. Efﬁciency enhancements: the FDA will implement various
efﬁciency enhancements that impact the review of both
ANDAs and DMFs, as well as inspections, upon enactment
of the program (i.e., use of complete review/response letters,
completeness assessments for DMFs intending to be refer-
enced by ANDA sponsors, division level deﬁciency review
and ﬁrst cycle telephonic meetings for ANDAs and DMFs). Regulatory science: the FDA will undertake various initia-
tives designed to enhance post-marketing safety, to develop
guidance for industry, and mitigate regulatory science gaps in
select generic regulatory pathways98.By focusing on equipping the FDA with additional resources to
ensure safety, provide more timely access to affordable, high-quality
generic drugs, and improve transparency within the agency, the generic
user fee program is expected to help FDA make signiﬁcant progress in
addressing critical industry-wide issues, truly eliminate the disparity
between foreign and domestic facility inspection rates, create a more
level playing ﬁeld for U.S. manufacturers, and better ensure the safety
of the global supply chain. The generic user fee plan is also expected to
provide resources for reviewing applications in a timely way, which
will also enable FDA to complete inspections and work with
companies to address issues that might otherwise lead to shortages99.12. Generic drug safety
In calendar year 2012, generic drugs represented 84% of all
prescriptions ﬁlled11. Over the period since the introduction of
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safety issues that can be ascribed to generic drugs “without cause”.
Perhaps the best known case occurred in the late 1980s and
involved a company called Pharmaceutical Basics and carbama-
zepine tablets. This company illegally micronized the carbamaze-
pine API used in their tablets without FDA approval of this
manufacturing change. This resulted in several ADE (Adverse
Drug Event) reports, including some deaths, as a result of the
altered blood levels caused by the micronized API100.
There is currently signiﬁcant debate concerning switching of
anti-epileptic drugs and the incidence of “break through” sei-
zures48,49. However, this and other debates are issues of switch-
ability and not issues of a more fundamental lack of safety or
efﬁcacy in anti-epileptic generic drug products. Despite the
thousands of A-rated generic products approved over the years
after the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the billions of
prescriptions ﬁlled with these products, generic drugs have a
remarkably good safety record. This strongly suggests that the
system of bioequivalence is a sound system as a basis for the
approval of generic drug products.13. Generic product substitution system
The system of generic product substitution has, above all else, been
the driving force behind the extraordinary success of the US generic
pharmaceutical industry over the years since the passage of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Despite the shaky start and the generic drug
scandal, generic drug utilization has continued to increase, driven by
the ever increasing prices of branded pharmaceutical products101.
It is difﬁcult to imagine a more efﬁcient system at pulling
generic drug products into and through the distribution channels85.
The system achieves the following:
 Does not require promotion of generics to physicians102.
 Does not require generic product marketing beyond best price
to distribution customers.
 Does not require physician approval to dispense generics.
 Does not require patient knowledge of generic products.
 Generics are more proﬁtable to dispensing pharmacies than
brand products.
 Generics are generally much less expensive than brand
products.
 Generic proﬁtability to the pharmacy ensures that new
generic products are “pulled” into the distribution chain and
that generic substitution rate is rapid.Generic utilization rates have reached 84% of all prescriptions
in the US in calendar year 201211.14. $4 generics
In 2006, Walmart, the largest retailer in the US, began to offer
selected generic drugs at $4 for a 30-day supply. The original list
included 314 products made up of 143 compounds in 24
therapeutic categories. Although originally seen as a gimmick by
some, the $4 program spread to most, if not all other chain store
pharmacies. Soon after, programs of $10 for a 3-month supply
were added (some $12)103. This is now a well entrenched
prescription supply program104. In more recent times, some chain
supermarkets have offered a number of common generic anti-
biotics free of charge. Not all lists offered by pharmacies are thesame, so more generic drugs are available in these programs then
at ﬁrst appeared to be the case.
Although public perception of these programs is that they are
“loss leaders” aimed at getting potential customers in the door
(certainly the case for the free antibiotics), in fact these drugs are
not being sold below cost. Many of these products are sold by
generic manufacturers for less than $1 per 30 units105. At these
prices virtually every patient who needs one of these generic drugs
can afford the cost.
The $4 programs are perhaps the pinnacle of the aim to make
prescription drugs affordable to virtually every patient who needs
these drugs. However, current generic manufacturers' prices are very
low because of intense competition. No manufacturer offering the
prices necessary for a $4 generic program can survive on these
margins, depending instead on newer, more proﬁtable products. If
there is a rationalization of the generic industry in the future that
includes pricing at the level necessary for manufacturers to continue
in business based on more mature products, then the $4 cost may
have to rise. The vast majority of patients do not realize how low
manufacturers' prices are because the retailers are generally using
very high markups, so it may come as a surprise to most consumers
if manufacturers' prices do rise to a sustainable level.15. Quality by design for generic drugs
Over recent years, quality by design (QbD) has been presented by
the OGD at various meetings as a necessary program to ensure
high quality in generic drug development. Starting from January 1,
2013, ANDAs would not be accepted for ﬁling without the QbD
elements included in the updated ANDA checklist106. In other
word, starting in 2013, ﬁling requirements for generics manufac-
turers will be much different than in the past. The FDA had
published immediate and modiﬁed release QbD examples to help
the manufacturers to prepare for QbD in 2013.
QbD in pharmaceuticals is a method where quality elements are
evaluated using systematic risk-based and science-based methods
in development, scale-up, and the manufacturing process to ensure
robust product quality.
QbD principles in the pharmaceutical development of original
ANDA product submissions are strongly encouraged. A risk-based,
scientiﬁcally sound submission must now include the following107:
 Quality target product proﬁle (QTPP).
 Critical quality attributes (CQAs) of the drug product.
 Product design and understanding including identiﬁcation of
critical attributes of excipients, drug substance(s), and/or
container closure systems. Process design and understanding including identiﬁcation of
critical process parameters and in-process material attributes. Control strategy and justiﬁcation.
Under QbD, to develop a generic product that is bioequivalent
to a RLD, an applicant must understand the attributes of the
formulation and manufacturing process that have the potential to
change the bioavailability of a particular active ingredient. Under
the current development and manufacturing path for generic drugs,
product quality and performance are determined by testing of the
product, whereas under the QbD system, quality is built into the
ﬁnal product by understanding and controlling formulation and
manufacturing variables. The aim of adopting QbD is that
consumers will receive quality products while manufacturers are
able to improve process through the implementation of QbD.
Development of the generic drug industry in the US after the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 30916. Summary
The modern US generic pharmaceutical industry was created by
the Hatch-Waxman Act and began accepting the ﬁrst ANDAs in
November 1984. The industry got off to a bad start with
widespread bribery and fraud characterizing the ﬁrst 5 years.
The generic drug scandal damaged the reputation of the FDA and
shook public conﬁdence in the Agency and in generic drugs.
However, the changes made as a result of the scandal changed the
relationship of FDA with the generic drug industry and ultimately
restored public conﬁdence in generic drug products.
Generic drugs were about 13% of all prescriptions in 1984 and
grew rapidly after the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed. By the late
1990s generic drugs were about 50% of prescriptions. They
remained at this level until the mid-2000s when prescription
growth resumed following patent expiration for a number of key
“ﬁrst in class” drugs. Generic prescription growth has accelerated
in the last few years and in calendar 2012, reached 84% of
prescriptions11.
The growth of generic drug use in the US has been impressive,
and likely beyond the most optimistic estimates at the time the law
was passed. This has been driven by a number of factors, the
success of the generic product substitution system with its provider
proﬁt motivation, the high cost of brand products which creates a
lot of “pricing space” for cheaper generic alternatives, the gradual
addition of most major therapeutic classes to the generic drug
product range, the lack of productivity of the brand industry in
ﬁnding new small molecule drugs, and government efforts to
increase generic drug use through government entitlement pro-
grams have all helped to drive generic drug utilization. Generic
drug use now stands at an all-time high. The brand industry now
has a prescription share of less than 20% and is attempting to
maintain proﬁtability by increasing prices on existing products
rather than on new products which have historically driven the
brand industry. This situation cannot persist for more than a few
more years and the future of the brand industry looks uncertain52.Acknowledgments
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